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Abstract. In this paper we investigate two important and related as-
pects of the formalization of open interaction systems: how to specify
norms, and how to enforce them by means of sanctions. The problem
of specifying the sanctions associated with the violation of norms is cru-
cial in an open system because, given that the compliance of autonomous
agents to obligations and prohibitions cannot be taken for granted, norm
enforcement is necessary to constrain the possible evolutions of the sys-
tem, thus obtaining a degree of predictability that makes it rational
for agents to interact with the system. In our model, norms are speci-
fied declaratively. When certain events take place, norms become active
and generate pending commitments for the agents playing certain roles.
Norms also specify the sanctions associated with their violation. In the
paper, we analyze the concept of sanction in detail and propose a mech-
anism through which sanctions can be applied.
Keywords. Norms, Sanctions, Commitments, Artificial Institutions, Open
Interaction Systems.
1 Introduction
In our previous works [1,2,3] we have presented a metamodel of artificial institu-
tions called OCeAN (Ontology, CommitmEnts, Authorizations, Norms), which
can be used to specify at a high level and in an unambiguous way open interac-
tion systems where heterogeneous and autonomous agents may interact.
In our view open interaction systems and artificial institutions used to model
them are a technological extension of human reality, that is, they are an instru-
ment by which human beings can enrich the type and the frequency of their
interactions and overcome geographical distance. Potential users of this kind of
systems are artificial agents, that can be more or less autonomous in making
decisions on behalf of their owners, and human beings using an appropriate in-
terface. For example, it is possible to devise an electronic auction where the
artificial agents are autonomous in deciding the amount of their bids, or an in-
teraction system for the organization of conferences in which human beings (like
the organizers, or the Program Committee members) act by means of artificial
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agents that have a very limited level of autonomy. In any case it is important to
remark that in every type of system there is always a stage when the software
agents have to interface with their human owners to perform certain actions in
the real world. For these reasons artificial institutions have to reflect, with the
necessary simplifications, crucial aspects of their human counterparts. Therefore
in devising our model we draw inspiration from an analysis of social reality [4]
and from human legal theory [5].
In this paper we concentrate mainly on the operational specification of the
normative component of artificial institutions. We will extend our OCeAN meta-
model by dealing with the problems of giving a declarative specification of norms
for open systems and of devising efficient and complete computational mecha-
nisms for managing norms. In particular we aim at automating the detection of,
and reaction to, the violations of norms. An important feature of our framework,
with respect to other proposals [6,7,8,9,10] is that it gives a uniform solution to
two crucial problems: the specification of norms and the definition of the seman-
tics of an Agent Communication Language. Indeed, our model of norms relies on
the notion of commitment [11], that has been previously introduced to express
the meaning of a library of communicative acts [12]. We analyze in detail the
problem of defining a mechanism for enforcing obligations and prohibitions by
means of sanctions, that is, a treatment of the actions to be performed when a
violation occurs, in order to deter agents from misbehaving and to secure and
recover the system from an undesirable state. We speak of “obligation and prohi-
bition enforcement” instead of “norm enforcement”, as done in other approaches,
because our proposal can be used to enforce obligations and prohibitions that
derive either from predefined norms or from the autonomous performance of
communicative acts. The problem of managing sanctions has been tackled in a
few other works: for example, Lo´pez y Lo´pez et al. [9] propose to enforce norms
using the “enforcement norms” that oblige agents entitled to do so to punish mis-
behaving agents; Va´zquez-Salceda et al. [10] present, in the OMNI framework, a
method to enforce norms described at a different level of abstraction; and Grossi
et al. in [13] develop a high-level analysis of the problem of enforcing norms.
Other interesting proposals introduce norms to regulate the interaction in open
systems but, even when the problem of enforcement is considered to be crucial,
do not investigate with sufficient depth why an agent ought to comply with
norms and what would happen if compliance does not occur. For instance, Es-
teva et al. [7,8] propose ISLANDER, where a normative language with sanctions
is defined but not discussed in detail, Boella et al. [14] model violations but do
not analyze sanctions, and Artikis et al. [6] propose a model where the problem
of norm enforcement using sanctions is mentioned but not fully investigated.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we briefly describe our meta-
model for artificial institutions. In Section 3 the reasons why in open interaction
frameworks it makes sense to allow for the violation of obligations and prohibi-
tions are discussed, and then in Section 4 a proposal on how to enforce obligations
and prohibitions by means of sanctions is presented. In Section 5 our model of
norms is described and our previous construct of commitment is extended by
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adding the treatment of sanctions. In Section 6 we exemplify our proposal and
finally in Section 7 we present the main conclusions that have been obtained.
2 The OCeAN metamodel
Our metamodel of artificial institutions as described in details in [1] consists
mainly of the following components:
– The constructs necessary to define the core ontology of an institution, in-
cluding: the notion of an entity, used to define the concepts introduced by
the institution (e.g., the notion of a run of an auction with its attributes
introduced by the institution of auctions); the notion of an institutional ac-
tion, described by means of their preconditions and postconditions (e.g., the
action of opening an auction, or declaring the current ask-price of an auc-
tion). The core ontology also defines the syntax of a list of base-level actions,
like for instance the action of exchanging a message, whose function is to
concretely execute institutional actions.
– Two fundamental concepts that are common to all artificial institutions and
that are used in the definition of other constructs: the notions of a role and of
an event. In particular roles are used in the specification of authorizations and
norms, while the happening of events is used to bring about the activation
of a norm or to specify the initial or final instance of a time interval.
– A counts-as relation that is necessary for the concrete performance of insti-
tutional actions. In particular, such relation relies on a set of conventions
that bind the exchange of a certain message, under a set of contextual con-
ditions, to the execution of an institutional action. Contextual conditions
include authorizations that specify what agents are authorized to perform
institutional actions. Authorizations are represented with the following no-
tation: Auth(role, iaction(parameters), conditions).
– The construct of norm, used to impose obligations and prohibitions to per-
form certain actions on agents interacting with the system. In our model, as
will be described in Section 5, we have declarative norms that, when their ac-
tivating event happens, are transformed into their operational counterpart,
that is, a commitment.
3 Regimentation vs. Enforcement
In our model, as it will be discussed in more detail in Section 5, an active obliga-
tion is expressed by means of commitments to perform an action of a given type
within a specified interval of time; similarly, an active prohibition is expressed by
a commitment not to perform an action of a given type; moreover, every action
is permitted unless it is explicitly forbidden. Note that a commitment can be
created not only by the activation of a norm, but also by the performance of a
communicative act [1], for instance by a promise.
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In this section we briefly discuss the reasons why in open interaction systems
it makes sense, and sometimes it is also inevitable, to allow for commitment
violations, that happen when a prohibited action is performed or when an oblig-
atory action is not performed within a predefined interval of time. The question
is, Why should we give an agent the possibility to violate commitments? Why
not adopt what in the literature is called “regimentation” [5], as proposed in
[13], by introducing a control mechanism that does not allow agents to violate
commitments?
To answer this question, it is useful to distinguish between natural (or phys-
ical) actions (like opening a door or physically delivering a product), whose
effects take place thanks to nonconventional physical laws, and institutional ac-
tions (like opening an auction or transferring the property of a product), whose
effects take place thanks to the common agreement of the interacting agents
(more precisely, of their designers).
Regarding physical actions, it is important to remark that they cannot be
regimented since, after they have been performed, they cannot be considered
“void”, that is, their effects cannot be annulled. Therefore it is impossible to
use regimentation to prevent the violation of a prohibition to perform a given
physical action.
Concerning institutional actions, the choice to allow for commitment viola-
tions or to impose regimentation is different in the case of obligations or prohi-
bitions:
– Prohibitions can be expressed using two different mechanisms: (i) through
the absence of authorization: in fact, when an agent performs a base-level ac-
tion bound by a convention to an institutional action ai, but the agent is not
authorized to perform ai, neither the “counts-as” relation nor the effects of ai
take place; (ii) through a commitment not to perform such an action: in this
case, if the action is authorized, its effects take place but the corresponding
commitment is violated. The solution to block the effects of certain actions
by changing their authorizations during the life of the system is adopted
for instance in AMELI (an infrastructure that mediates agent interactions
by enforcing institutional rules) by means of governors [15], which filter the
agents’ actions letting only the allowed actions to be performed. However,
this solution is not feasible when more than one institution contributes to the
definition of an interaction system, as happens for example when the Dutch
Auction and the Auction-House institutions contribute to the specification
of an interaction system as presented in [2] and briefly recalled in Section 6.
In such cases, an action authorized by an institution cannot be annulled by
another institution, which at most can prohibit it.
– With respect to obligations, there is only one way to “regiment” the perfor-
mance of an obliged action, that is, by making the system performing the
obliged action instead of a misbehaving agent. But this solution is not always
viable, especially when the agent has to set the values of some parameters
of the action. For instance, the auctioneer of a Dutch Auction is repeatedly
obliged to declare an ask price lower than the one previously declared, but
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can autonomously decide the value of the decrement; therefore it would be
difficult for the system to perform the action on behalf of the auctioneer. In
any case it has to be taken into account that, even if the regimentation of
obligations violates the autonomy of self-interested interacting agents, some-
times it can be adopted to recover the system from an undesirable state.
Finally it is important to remark that in an open system, where heteroge-
neous agents interact exhibiting self-interested behavior based on a hidden utility
function, it is impossible to predict at design phase all the interesting and fruitful
behaviors that may emerge. To reach an optimal solution for all participants [16]
it may be profitable to allow agents to violate their obligations and prohibitions.
We therefore conclude that regimenting an artificial system so that violations
of commitments are completely avoided is often impossible and sometimes even
detrimental, since it may preclude interesting evolutions of the system towards
results that are impossible to foresee at design time. It is also true, however,
that in order to make the evolution of the system at least partially predictable,
misbehavior must be reduced to a minimum. But then, how is it possible to
deter agents from violating commitments? An operational proposal to tackle this
problem, based on the notion of sanction, is described in the following sections.
4 Sanctions
In this section we briefly discuss the crucial role played by sanctions in the
specification of an open interaction system. In the Merriam-Webster On Line
Dictionary 1 a sanction is defined as “the detriment, loss of reward, or coercive
intervention annexed to a violation of a law as a means of enforcing the law”. In
an artificial system, even if the utility function of the misbehaving agent is not
known, sanctions can be devised:
– to deter agents from misbehaving bringing about a loss for them in case of
violation, under the assumption that the interacting heterogeneous agents
are human beings or artificial agents able to reason on sanctions;
– to compensate the institution or other damaged agents for their loss due to
the misbehavior of the agents;
– to contribute to the security of the system, for example by prohibiting mis-
behaving agents to interact any longer with the system;
– to specify the acts that have to be performed to recover the system from an
undesirable state [17].
When thinking about sanctions from an operational point of view, and in
particular to the set of actions that have to be performed when a violation
occurs, it is important to distinguish between two types of actions that differ
mainly as far as their actors are concerned:
1 <http://www.m-w.com>
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– One crucial type of action that deserves to be analyzed in detail, and that is
not taken into account in other proposals [9,10,8], consists of the actions that
the misbehaving agent itself has to perform against a violation, and that are
devised as a deterrent and/or a compensation for the violation. For instance,
an unruly agent may have to pay a fine or compensate another agent for the
damage. When trying to model this type of action it is important to take
into account that it is also necessary to check that the compensating actions
are performed and, if not, to sanction again the agent or, in some situations,
to give it a new possibility to remedy the situation.
– Another type is characterized by the actions that certain agents are au-
thorized to perform only against violations. In other existing proposals, for
instance [9,10], which do not highlight the notion of authorization (or power
[18]), those actions are simply the actions that certain agents are obliged to
perform against violations. From our point of view, instead, the obligation
to sanction a violation should be distinguished from the authorization to do
so. The reason why authorizations are crucial is obvious: sanctions can only
be issued by agents playing certain specific roles in an institution. But an
authorization does not always carry an obligation with it.
In some situations, and in particular when the sanction is crucial for the
continuation of the interaction, one may want to express the obligation for au-
thorized agents to react to violations by defining an appropriate new norm. For
instance, in the organization of a conference if a referee does not meet the dead-
line for submitting a review, the organizers are not only authorized, but also
obliged to reassign the paper to another referee. The norm that may be intro-
duced to oblige the agents entitled to do so to manage the violation is similar
to the “enforcement norm” proposed in [9]: it has to be activated by a violation
and its content has to coincide with the sanctions of the violated obligation or
prohibition. This norm may in turn be violated, and it is up to the designer of
the system to decide when to stop the potentially infinite chain of violations and
sanctions, leaving some violation unpunished.
Regarding this aspect, to make it reasonable for certain agents (or for their
owner) to interact with an open system, it has to be possible to specify that
certain violations will definitely be punished (assuming that there are not soft-
ware failures). One approach is to specify that the actor of the actions performed
as sanctions for those violations is the interaction-system itself, that therefore
needs to be represented in our model as a “special agent”. By “special” we mean
that such an agent will not be able to take autonomous decisions, and will only
be able to follow the system specifications that are stated before the interaction
starts. We call this type of agents heteronomous (as opposite to autonomous).
Note that the given that the interaction-system can become, in an actual im-
plementation, the actor of numerous actions performed as sanctions it would be
better to implement it in a distributed manner in order to avoid that it becomes
a possible bottleneck.
Examples of reasonable sanctions that can be inflicted by means of norms
in an open artificial system are the decrement of the trust or reputation level of
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the agent (similar to the reduction of the driving licence points that is nowadays
applied in some countries), the revocation of the authorization to perform certain
actions or a change of role (similar to confiscation of the driving licence) or,
as a final action, the expulsion of the agent from the system. Another type of
sanction typical of certain contracts (i.e., sets of correlated commitments created
by performing certain communicative acts) is the authorization for an agent to
break its part of the contract, without incurring a violation, if the counterpart
has violated its own commitments.
5 Norms
In an open system, norms are necessary to impose obligations and prohibitions
to the interacting agents, in order to make the systems evolution at least par-
tially predictable [19,20]. In particular, norms can be used to express interaction
protocols as exemplified in [1,2], where the English Auction and the Dutch Auc-
tion are specified by indicating what agents can do, cannot do, and have to do
at each state of the interaction. In this section we propose a development of
the model of norms that we have presented in our previous works [1,2,3], which
clearly separates the declarative form of norms from their operational counter-
part, that is, commitment, and from the procedure to transform the former into
the second.
Norms are taken as a specification of how a system ought to evolve. At design
time, the main point is to guarantee that the system has certain crucial prop-
erties. This result can be achieved by formalizing obligations and prohibitions
by means of logic and applying model checking techniques as studied in [21,22].
At run time, and from the point of view of the interacting agents, norms can be
used to reason about the relative utility of future actions [23]. Still at run time,
but from the point of view of the open interaction system, norms can be used to
check whether the agents behavior is compliant with the specifications and able
to suitably react to violations. Our model of norms is mainly suited for the last
task.
Coherent with other approaches [7,6,8,9,10], in our view norms have to specify
who is affected by them, who is the creditor, what are the actions that should
or should not be performed, and what are the consequences of violating them.
For instance, a norm of a university may state that a professor has to be ready
to give exams any day from the middle to the end of February, otherwise the
dean is authorized to lower the professors public reputation level.
From the point of view of the specification of a system, and in particular of
its set of norms, it is crucial to abstract away from the actual set of agents that
are interacting with the system at a given time, a result that can be achieved by
using the notion of role in the definition of norms. Moreover, the time instant at
which a norm becomes active is typically not known at design time, being related
to the occurrence of certain events; for example, the agent playing the role of the
auctioneer in an English auction is obliged to declare the current ask-price after
receiving each bid by a participant. Whereas at during the system run time,
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norms must produce an unambiguous representation of the obligations and pro-
hibitions that every agent has at every state of the interaction. For these reasons
we propose a declarative description of norms expressed in terms of roles and
times of events, which at run time can generate commitments relative to specific
agents and time intervals. The main advantage of using commitments to express
active obligations and permissions is that the same construct used to represent
the activation of declarative norms is also used in our model of institutions to
express the semantics of numerous communicative acts [1]. Interacting agents
may therefore be designed to reason on just one construct to make them able to
reason on all their obligations and prohibitions, derived both from norms and
from the performance of communicative acts.
5.1 Declarative norms
First of all a norm is used to impose a certain behavior on certain agents in the
system. Therefore a norm is applied to a set of agents, identified by means of
the debtors attribute, on the basis of the roles they play in the system.
Another fundamental component of a norm is its content, which describes the
actions that the debtors have to perform (if the norm expresses an obligation) or
not to perform (if the norm expresses a prohibition) within a specified interval
of time. In our model temporal propositions, which are defined by the Basic
Institution (for a detailed treatment see [11]), are used to represent the content
of commitments and, due to the strict connection between commitments and
norms, are also used to represent the content of norms. A temporal proposition
binds a statement about a state of affairs or about the performance of an action
to a specific interval of time with a certain mode (that can be ∀ or ∃). Temporal
propositions are represented with the following notation:
TP (statement, [tstart, tend],mode, truth-value),
where the truth-value could be undefined (⊥), true or false. In particular
when the statement represents the performance of an action and the mode is ∃,
the norm is an obligation and the debtors of the norms have to perform the action
within the interval of time. When the statement represents the non-performance
of an action and the mode is ∀ the norm is a prohibition and the debtors of
the norms should not perform the action within the interval of time. The time
interval of the content is strictly connected to norms activation and deactivation
events, that are described later on. In particular tstart is always equal to the
time of occurrence of the event that activates the norm, and tend is equal to
the time of occurrence of the event that deactivates the norm. Regarding the
verification of prohibitions, in order to be able to check that an action has not
been performed during an interval of time it is necessary to rely on the closure
assumption that if an action is not recorded as happened in the system, then it
has not happened.
A norm becomes active when the activation event estart happens and becomes
inactive when the deactivation event eend takes place. Activation can also depend
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on some Boolean conditions, that have to be true in order that the norm can
become active; for instance an auctioneer may be obliged to open a run of an
auction at time tstart if at least two participants are present.
An agent can reason whether fulfil or not to fulfil a norm on the basis of
the sanctions (as discussed later) and of who is the creditor of the norm, as
proposed also in [24,9]. For example, an agent with the role of auctioneer may
decide to violate a norm imposed by the auction house if it is in conflict with
another norm that regulates trade transactions in a certain country. The creditor
of a declarative norm, given that it becomes the creditor of the commitments
generated by the norm (as described in next section), is the only agent authorized
to cancel such commitment [1]. In particular the operation of cancelling the
commitment generated by the activation of a norm coincides with the operation
of exempting an agent from obeying the norm in certain circumstances. Like for
the debtors attribute, it is useful to express the creditor of declarative norms by
means of their role. For instance, a norm may state that an employee is obliged
to report to his director on the last day of each month; this norm will become
active on the last day of each month and will be represented by means of a set of
commitments, each having an actual employee as the debtor, and the employees
director as the creditor.
Sometimes it may be useful to take the creditor of norms to be an institution-
alized agent, that typically represents a human organization, like a university, a
hospital, or a company, which can be regarded as the creditors of their bylaws.
In the human world, an institutionalized agent is an abstract entity that can
perform actions only through a human being, who is its legal representative and
has the right mandate [25]. On the contrary, in an artificial system it is always
possible to create an agent that represents an organization but can directly exe-
cute actions. Therefore we prefer to view an institutionalized agent as a special
role that can be assigned to one and only one agent having the appropriate
authorizations, obligations, and prohibitions.
In order to enforce norms it is necessary to specify sanctions. More precisely,
as discussed in the previous section, it is necessary to specify what actions have
to be performed, when a violation occurs, by the debtors of a norm and by
the agent(s) in charge of norm enforcement. These two types of actions, that
we respectively call d-sanctions (debtors sanctions) and e-sanctions (enforcers
sanctions) are sharply dissimilar, and thus require a different treatment. More
specifically, to specify a d-sanction means to describe an action that the violator
should perform in order to extinguish its violation; therefore, a d-sanction can be
specified through a temporal proposition representing an action. On the contrary,
to specify an e-sanction means to describe what actions the norm enforcer is
authorized to perform in the face of a violation; therefore, an e-sanction can be
specified by representing a suitable set of authorizations.
Regarding d-sanctions, it is necessary to consider that a violating agent may
have more than one possibility to extinguish its violation. For example, an agent
may have to pay a fine of x euro within one month, and failing to do so may
have to pay a fine of 2 ∗ x euro within two months. In principle we may regard
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the second sanction as a compensation for not paying the first fine in due time,
but this approach would require an unnecessarily complex procedure of viola-
tion detection. Given that any Boolean combination of temporal propositions is
still a temporal proposition, and that the truth-value of the resulting temporal
proposition can be obtained from the truth-values of its components using an
extended truth table to manage the indefinite truth-value [26], a more viable
solution consists in specifying every possible action with a different temporal
proposition, and combining them using the OR operator.
In summary, in our model declarative norms are characterized by the follow-
ing attributes having the specified domains:
debtors: role;
creditor : role;
content : temporal proposition;
estart: event-template;
eend: event-template;
conditions: Boolean expression;
d-sanctions: temporal proposition;
e-sanctions: authorization;
5.2 Commitments with Sanctions
In order to give an intuitive operational semantics to the declarative represen-
tation of norms introduced so far, we now describe an operational mechanism
to transform them, at run time, into their operational counterpart, that is, into
commitments relative to specific agent and time interval. The transformation
of declarative norms in commitments is crucial in the actual evolution of the
system because they are the mechanisms used to detect and react to violations.
Moreover given that the activation event of norms may happen more than once
in the life of the system, it is possible to distinguish between different activations
and, in case, violations of the same norm. Given that our previous treatment of
commitment [11,1] does not cover sanctions, in this section we extend it to cover
this aspect.
In our model a special institution, the Basic Institution, defines the construct
of commitment, which is represented with the following notation:
Comm(state, debtor, creditor, content).
The content of commitments is expressed using temporal propositions (briefly
recalled in Section 5.1). The state of a commitment can change as an effect of
the execution of institutional actions or of environmental events. Relevant events
for the life cycle of commitments are due to the change of the truth-value of the
commitments content: if the content becomes true the commitment becomes
fulfilled, otherwise it becomes violated as described in Figure 1.
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In our view an operational model of sanctions has to specify how to detect
that a commitment has been violated, that the debtor of the violated commit-
ment performs the compensating actions and that the agents entitled to enforce
the norms have managed the violation by performing certain actions.
In our model, when the content of a commitment becomes false an event-
driven routine (that as discussed in [2] can be implemented applying the ob-
server pattern [27]) automatically changes the commitments state to violated.
Regarding the necessity to check that the debtor performs the compensating
actions, one solution may be to create a new commitment to perform those ac-
tions. A simpler and more elegant solution consists in adding two new attributes,
d-sanctions and e-sanctions, to commitments, and two new states, extinguished
and irrecoverable, to their life-cycle. The value of the d-sanctions attribute is a
temporal proposition describing the actions that the debtor of the commitment
has to perform, within a given interval of time, to remedy the violation. If the
actions indicated in the d-sanctions attribute are performed, the truth-value
of the related temporal proposition becomes true and an event driven routine
automatically changes the state of the violated commitment to extinguished, as
reported in Figure 1. Analogously, if the debtor does not perform those actions,
at the end of the specified time interval the truth-value of the temporal proposi-
tion becomes false and the state of the commitment becomes irrecoverable. The
actions that the agents entitled to do so are authorized to perform against the
violation of the commitment are represented in the e-sanctions attribute. Note
that whether such actions are or are not performed does not affect the life cy-
cle of the commitment; this depends on the fact that the agent that violated a
commitment cannot be held responsible for a possible failure of other agents to
actually carry out the actions they are authorized to perform.
content.truth_value=1 
makeCommitment 
setPending 
violated 
 
fulfilled 
 
setCancel 
setCancel 
content.truth_value=0 
content.truth_value=1 
pending 
 
cancelled 
 
unset 
 
d-sanctions.truth_value=0 
irrecoverable 
 
extinguished 
 
d-sanctions.truth_value=1 
Fig. 1. The life-cycle of commitments.
Finally, for proper management of violation it may be necessary to trace the
source of a commitment, either deriving it from the activation of a norm or from
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the performance of a communicative act. In order to represent this aspect we
add to commitments an optional attribute called source. Our enriched notion of
commitment is therefore represented with the following notation:
Comm(state, debtor, creditor, content, d-sanctions, e-sanctions, source).
In our model we use ECA-rules (Event-Condition-Action rules) to specify
that certain actions are executed when an event identified by an event-templates
happens, provided that certain Boolean conditions are true; the interaction-
system agent (see Section 4) is the actor of the actions performed by means
of ECA-rules, and has to have the necessary authorization in order to perform
them.
The following ECA-rule transforms at run time declarative norms into com-
mitments: when the activation event (estart) of the norm happens, themakePend-
ingComm institutional action is performed and creates a pending commitment
for each agent playing one of the roles specified in the debtors attribute of the
norm:
on estart
if norm.conditions then
do foreach agent | agent.role in norm.debtors
do makePendingComm(agent, norm.creditor, norm.content,
norm.d-sanctions, norm.e-sanctions, norm-ref)
When a commitment is violated, another ECA-rule gives the authorizations
expressed in the e-sanctions attributes to the relevant agents:
on e: AttributeChange(comm.state, violated)
if true then
do foreach auth in comm.e-sanctions
do createAuth(auth.role, auth.iaction)
The createAuth(role,iaction) institutional action creates the authorization for
the agents playing a certain role to perform a certain institutional action. We
assume that the interaction-system (the actor of ECA-rules) is always authorized
to create new authorizations.
To guarantee that the interaction-system actually performs the actions spec-
ified in the e-sanctions attribute, it is possible to create an ECA-rule that reacts
to commitments violation performing those actions:
on e: AttributeChange(commitment.state, violated)
if true then
do foreach auth in commitment.e-sanctions
if auth.role = interaction-system
do auth.iaction(parameters)
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6 Example
An interesting example that highlights the importance of a clear distinction
between permission and authorization, which becomes relevant when more than
one institution is used to specify the interaction system, is the specification of
the Dutch Auction as discussed in [2].
One of the norms of the Dutch Auction obliges the auctioneer to declare a
new ask-price (within λ seconds) lowering the previous one by a certain amount
κ, on condition that δ seconds have elapsed from the last declaration of the
ask-price without any acceptance act from the participants. If the auctioneer
violates this norm the interaction-system is authorized to declare the ask-price
and to lower the auctioneer’s public reputation level (obviously there is no need
of an authorization to change a private reputation level), while the auctioneer
has to pay a fine (within h seconds) to extinguish its violation. Such a norm can
be expressed in the following way:
debtors= auctioneer;
creditor= auction-house;
content= TP (setAskPrice(DutchAuction.LastPrice-κ),
[time-of(estart), time-of(eend)],∃,⊥);
estart= TimeEvent(DutchAuction.timeLastPrice+ δ);
eend= TimeEvent(time-of(estart) + λ);
conditions= DutchAuction.offer.value = null;
d-sanctions=TP (pay(ask-price, interaction-system);
[time-of(e), time-of(e) + h], ∃,⊥);
e-sanctions=Auth(interaction-system, setAskPrice(value)),
Auth(interaction-system,ChangeRep(auctioneer, value));
where variable e refers to the event that happens if the commitment generated
at run-time by this norm is violated.
At the same time, the seller of a product can fix the minimum price (minPrice)
at which the product can be sold, for example by means of an act of proposal
[26]. The auction house, by means of its auctioneer, sells the product in a run
of the Dutch Auction where the auctioneer is authorized to lower the price to
a predetermined reservation price. The reservation price fixed by the auction
house can be lower than minPrice, for example because in previous runs of the
auction the product remained unsold. If the auctioneer actually sells the product
at a price (winnerPrice) lower that minPrice, the sale is valid but the auction
house violates its commitment with the seller of the product and will incur the
corresponding sanctions; for example, it may have to refund the seller, while the
seller is authorized to lower the reputation of the auction house. This situation
can be modelled by the following commitment between the seller and the auction
house:
state= pending;
debtor= auction-house;
creditor= seller;
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content= TP (not setCurPrice(p) | p < minPrice,
[now,+∞)], ∃,⊥)
d-sanctions= TP (pay(seller,minPrice-winnerPrice),
[time-of(e), time-of(e)+15days], ∃,⊥)
e-sanctions= Auth(seller, ChangeReputation(auction-house, value))
where variable e refers to the event that happens if the commitment is violated.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have discussed the importance of formalizing and enforcing
obligations and prohibitions in the specification of open interaction frameworks.
We have proposed a normative component characterized by declarative norms,
expressed in terms of roles and event times. The operational semantics of the
declarative norms is defined by the commitments they generate through ECA-
rules.
The innovative aspects of our proposal are the definition of different types
of sanctions and of the operational mechanisms for monitoring the behavior of
the agents and reacting to commitment violations. In particular, an interesting
feature of our proposal is that the construct of commitment is uniformly used to
model the semantics of communicative acts and of norms; thus artificial agents
able to reason on commitments can deal with both ACL semantics and the
normative component of the interaction system.
Differently from [9] our model of norms specifies the interval of time within
which norms are active. Thanks to their transformation into commitments, it
is possible to apply certain norms (whose activation event may happen many
times) more than once in the life of the system. Another crucial aspect of our
norms is that, differently from [9], they are activated by the occurrence of events
and not simply if a certain state holds. Regarding the treatment of sanctions
our model is more in-depth with respect to other proposals [9,10,13] because
we distinguish the actions of the debtors from the actions of the other agents
that are entitled to react to violations. In particular, regarding the actions of
the debtors, we propose an effective solution for managing multiple sanctions,
that is, multiple possibilities to compensate the violation (for example, paying
an increasing amount of money), without entering in an infinite loop of checking
violations and applying punishments. Regarding the sanctions applied by other
agents, we discussed the reasons why a norm expresses what actions are autho-
rized against violations and the reasons why some norms may be enforced by
the interaction-system itself, which is treated as a special heteronomous agent.
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